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PROBLEMS OF PLAINTIFF IN PLEADING
NEGLIGENCE
ROBERT KOVACH*
In a case based upon negligence the plaintiff, under code or com-
mon law pleading, must plead facts in his petition showing (1) that
the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) that the defendant
breached the duty, and (3) that as a result of such breach of duty
the plaintiff suffered damage.' Ordinarily the plaintiff will have little
difficulty in meeting the first and third requirements, for as far as the
first is concerned, all he need do is plead facts clearly showing the
relationship which existed between himself and the defendant just
prior to and at the time of the injury-from which relationship the
existence and nature of the duty can be determined; 2 and as far as
the third is concerned, all he need do is employ proper language indi-
cating that the damage he suffered was the direct result of the de-
fendant's breach of duty.3 It would seem that any failures to comply
with the first and third requirements are usually the result of inad-
vertance, i.e., failure of the plaintiff to focus his attention upon such
requirements when he is drafting the petition.4
The requirement that facts be pleaded showing that the defend-
* Professor of Law, Franklin University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1 Clark, Code Pleading 298 (2d ed. 1947); Shipman, Common Law Pleading 214
(2d ed. 1923).
2 "Thus, in an action for negligent injury it must appear that the plaintiff was in a
situation where defendant owed him a duty to exercise due care for his safety, as that
defendant was in control of machinery or other agency causing danger to the plaintiff,
for which the defendant was responsible. A bare allegation that the defendant owed a
legal duty to plaintiff is a mere conclusion of law and worthless; the facts creating the
duty must be alleged, as that the relation of passenger and carrier existed. The existence
of defendant's duty toward the plaintiff must appear from facts or circumstances from
which the law infers such duty, as where the defendant's liability is based upon his
ownership or control of the premises upon which the injury occurred and his duty
to furnish employees a safe place to work." Shipman, op. cit. supra note 1, at 214-5.
The manner of pleading facts showing the existence of the defendant's duty which
sufficed at common law, it is submitted, should also suffice under code pleading. See
also Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 298-9; James, "Scope of Duty in Negligence
Cases," 47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 778, 779-780 (1953).
3 "'Whereby' and 'by means of the premises' are frequently used to charge that
injury resulted from the defendant's act to plaintiff's person or property, and that the
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury." Shipman, op. cit. supra note 1, at
217. See also Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 299.
4 For extreme cases holding that plaintiff failed in these respects, see Knowles v.
Wohnan, 141 Me. 120, 39 A.2d 666 (1944) (failure to allege duty); City of Logansport
v. Kihm, 159 Ind. 68, 64 N.E. 595 (1902) (failure to allege causation).
435
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
ant breached the duty, however, is a different matter, and it would
seem to pose the greatest obstacle to the plaintiff in pleading his case.
The problem here is how to describe the defendant's conduct and this
requires a determination of how detailed a description the plaintiff
must give. In other words a plaintiff in describing the same oc-
currence may state that the defendant "negligently struck me," or
"negligently drove his car against me" or "negligently drove his car at
a speed of 100 m.p.h. on the wet pavement, and as a result, in trying
to stop, skidded against me." It is obvious that in the first statement
the plaintiff is simply describing the act of the defendant in a broad
general way and averring that it was negligently done, whereas in the
subsequent statements he is progressively giving a more detailed or
specific description of the act of the defendant. Thus, the question at
the outset is how detailed or specific must the facts be which are
pleaded to show that the defendant breached the duty? Since this
would seem to be a question that may be answered in as many ways
as there are individuals answering, it is clear that the task of the
plaintiff in meeting this requirement may be formidable.
Under common law pleading the plaintiff was aided by certain
rules which lightened considerably the burden of his task. Thus, a
general mode of pleading was allowed where great prolixity was
thereby avoided;" no greater particularity was required than the
nature of the thing pleaded would conveniently admit; 7 less particu-
larity was required when the facts lay more in the knowledge of the
opposite party, than of the party pleading; 8 and things were to be
pleaded according to their legal effect or operation.' It was probably
a combination of such rules which enabled the plaintiff in an action of
trespass on the case for negligence to plead the defendant's breach of
duty by simply describing the act of the defendant in broad general
terms and averring that it was carelessly or negligently done. Thus,
the plaintiff's declaration might contain the allegation that the defend-
ant "having in his hands a firelock, highly charged with powder, and
5 Cf.: "At this point we come to the crux of the matter. How much is enough? Ob-
viously, the codes as formulated either in New York or Illinois, give no answer to that:
as many answers might be given as there are persons who attempt an answer, were it
not for one thing, namely, past habits and practices of the legal profession, in Illinois and
in other states. Small wonder that in England, in New York, and in other code states
chaos reigned after the adoption of the 'simplified procedure.' The ancient landmarks
had been swept away and no new ones had been put in their place." Cook, "'Facts' and
'Statements of Fact'" 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 233, 243-244 (1937).
6 Stephen, Pleading 318-320 (Tyler 3d ed. 1882).
7 Id. at 326-8.
8 Id. at 328-9.
9 Id. at 341-2.
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a great quantity of wadding, so exceedingly carelessly managed his said
firelock, that he discharged its contents into the foot of the plaintiff,"'"
or that the defendant "so carelessly, unskilfully, and improperly
drove, governed and directed his said gig and horse that... the said
gig and horse .. . ran and struck ... the cart and horse of the plain-
tiff."' It is obvious that the specific act of negligence of which the
plaintiff complains cannot be determined by an examination of such
a pleading of the breach of duty. It must have seemed clear to the
common law judges that the defendant was not prejudiced by the
failure of the plaintiff to point to the specific shortcoming of the
defendant, the judges perhaps thinking that the defendant knew what
he did and how he did it, or, if the act was committed by his agent,
that the defendant had the means at his command to determine the
matter and thus could adequately prepare his defense. It is true that
under some circumstances the defendant was entitled to a bill of
particulars in which the plaintiff would be required to be more specific,
but this was a matter which rested in the sound discretion of the court,
and in exercising this discretion the court would weigh the very same
factors which gave rise to the above pleading rules, i.e., the ability or
inability of a party to furnish particulars, the knowledge of the
parties, etc."2 It would seem, then, that under common law pleading
the defendant would, in the ordinary negligence case, be compelled
to accept the plaintiff's pleading of the defendant's breach of duty in
the form of an allegation of carelessness or negligence in the doing of
an act, the act being described in broad general terms.
Under code pleading, however, a different approach has been
taken, at least by some courts. In Davis v. Guarnieri,'3 the plaintiff,
as administrator of the estate of his wife, Angela, brought a wrongful
death action against the defendant pharmacist. In his petition the
plaintiff alleged that he requested the defendant to sell to him some oil
of sweet almonds to be administered to his wife, Angela; that the
defendant in filling the order:
did so carelessly and negligently put up said medicine, and make
said sale, that instead of putting up the oil of sweet almonds, as was
called for, he put up and sold to him twenty cents worth of a
certain poisonous drug called the oil of bitter almonds ... and the
same was wrongfully, negligently, and carelessly sold and delivered
10 Dalton v. Favour, 3 N.H. 465 (1826).
11 Williams v. Holland, 10 Bing. 112, 131 Eng. Rep. 848 (1833). See Clark, "Plead-
ing Negligence," 32 Yale L.J. 483, 485 (1922).
12 See Hook, "The Bill of Particulars in Illinois," 19 Ill. L. Rev. 315 (1915); Clark,
op. cit. supra note 11. Compare Caskey, "The Bill of Particulars--A Brief for the
Defendant," 27 Va. L. Rev. 472 (1941).
13 45 Ohio St. 470, 15 N.E. 350 (1887).
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to him for his wife by defendant.., instead of the medicine called
for;
and that Angela, after taking the oil of bitter almonds, died from its
effects. It should be observed that the above-quoted allegation of the
defendant's breach of duty is practically identical to that employed
in the usual negligence case under common law pleading, although it
may be that a more detailed description of the defendant's wrongful
act is set forth than was customary at common law. It should be ob-
served also that the defendant neither demurred nor filed a motion to
make definite and certain, but was content to file an answer, which
consisted in the main of an argumentative denial. During his charge,
the trial judge read to the jury an Ohio statute which made it a crime
to sell a poisonous drug without marking the word "poison" upon the
label or wrapper containing the same, and the judge then charged the
jury that if the defendant violated this statute the defendant was
negligent. The defendant contended that the trial judge erred in
referring to the statute and commenting thereon in his charge to the
jury on the ground that negligence of that character was not charged
in the petition. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, said:
It is true that this fact is not stated in the petition. It is also
true that the substantive wrongful act of which the plaintiff com-
plained, was not the omission properly to label a poisonous drug
as the statute requires. The wrongful act complained of-the act
which led to the injury-was carelessly selling and delivering to the
plaintiff a deadly poison instead of the harmless medicine he called
for.
The contention of counsel presupposes that no act of negligence
can be proved except it be alleged in the petition. This position is
untenable. The allegation in a pleading that the party complained
against negligently committed the particular act which led to the
injury whose redress is sought, furnishes the predicate for the proof
of all such incidental facts and circumstances both of omission and
commission as fairly tend to establish the negligence of the primary
fact complained of.
This rule of pleading is abundantly established by authority....
The plaintiff in the case at bar, having alleged that the de-
fendant carelessly sold and delivered to the plaintiff a poisonous
drug for harmless medicine, could safely rest the issue upon such
averment. To plead specially all the facts and circumstances from
which the negligence could be inferred, would be to plead evidence
instead of facts.1 4
It may be that the Guarnieri case merely illustrates the proposition
that under an allegation of negligence in the doing of an act pleaded,
any evidence tending to show negligence in the doing of such act is
14 Id. at 484-6, 15 N.E. at 358.
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admissible, and that a charge to the jury based upon such evidence is
proper. However, while it is always dangerous to speculate as to what
a court might have done, it is submitted that had the defendant in the
Guarnieri case filed a motion to require the plaintiff to make the peti-
tion definite and certain by indicating more specifically the act
or acts of negligence complained of, the court would not have sus-
tained the motion since, in its view, "to plead specially all the facts
and circumstances from which the negligence could be inferred would
be to plead evidence instead of facts."'" While it may be conceded
that the court's use of the word "evidence" in this context is question-
able, in that by pleading the facts and circumstances from which
negligence could be inferred one would really be pleading "facts" in
greater detail rather than pleading "evidence," 1" it seems clear that
the court would not have looked with favor upon a request by the
defendant that the plaintiff be required to plead the act or acts of the
defendant complained of with greater particularity. Perhaps the
plaintiff's description of the defendant's act was sufficiently specific to
satisfy the court, hence its view toward further particularization; but
it is suggested, with great temerity, that the court in the Guarnieri
case viewed the common law method of pleading negligence-an
allegation of negligence in the doing of an act, the act being described
in broad general terms-as a proper method of pleading the defend-
ant's breach of duty under the code.17 In any event, it is submitted
that such a view would be proper. Looking at the "Forms for Illustra-
tion" which the commissioners who drafted the Ohio code pleading
statute appended to their "Report,"" it becomes apparent that the
commissioners did not intend to change the method of pleading
negligence which sufficed at common law, and that in their view an
15 While the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be applied in cases of this character
(see Edestein v. Cook, 108 Ohio St. 346, 140 N.E. 765 (1923), it is submitted that the
court would have denied such a motion without using as a basis the fact that the
doctrine was applicable.
16 See Cook, "Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes," 21 Colum. L.
Rev. 416 (1921); Clark, op. cit. supra note 11; Dowdall, "Pleading 'Material Facts,'" 77
U. Pa. L. Rev. 945 (1929); Cook, op. cit. supra note 5; James, "The Objective and
Function of the Complaint," 14 Vand. L. Rev. 899 (1961).
17 The court cited with approval the following common law cases in which it was
held (upon either a demurrer or a motion to make definite and certain) or
stated by way of dictum that the plaintiff's general description of the defendant's act was
sufficient, and the plaintiff need not plead the specific facts showing in what the
negligence consisted: Ware v. Gay, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 106 (1831) (dictum); McCauley
v. Davidson, 10 Minn. (10 Gilf.) 418 (1865) (so held on demurrer); Clark v. Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. Co., 15 Fed. 588 (S.D. Iowa 1883) (so held on motion).
18 Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings, Code of Civil Procedure
(1853), 235 (Appendix).
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allegation of negligence in the doing of an act, the act being described
in broad general terms, would be sufficient under the code. 9 And it
is further submitted that there is no evidence to indicate that the
legislature was of a different mind.
In The New York, C. & St. L. Rd. Co. v. Kistler,2" however,
the Ohio Supreme Court apparently took a different view of the
matter. The plaintiff was struck by the defendant's train at a crossing,
and she sued to recover damages for the injuries which she sustained.
From the opinion of the court it appears that the plaintiff alleged in
her petition that the defendant:
negligently and carelessly approached and crossed said highway
with said locomotive and train of cars at a high, immoderate and
dangerous rate of speed, and negligently and carelessly omitted to
give proper and sufficient signals or warning of the approach of
said locomotive and train to said crossing, and of the existence of
said crossing, and negligently and carelessly allowed and maintained
obstructions to a proper view of its said train, locomotive and rail-
road and negligently and carelessly operated and handled its said
locomotive and train of cars.
The defendant filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to make her
petition definite and certain as to the acts of negligence charged, and
particularly to state the facts in regard to the defendant's negligently
and carelessly operating and handling the locomotive and train, and
to strike out the words "at a high, immoderate and dangerous rate of
speed." The trial court overruled the motion and, subsequently,
rendered judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant
appealed, contending that the trial court erred in overruling its motion.
After referring to the Ohio Code as to the power of a court to require
pleadings to be made definite and certain by amendment,2 ' the Ohio
Supreme Court said:
This means that the court shall in a proper case require the
pleading to be made definite and certain. It is not a mere matter of
discretion. It is a substantial right to a party to have the pleading
19 The illustrative form "For Injury to the Person" reads:
"Plaintiff says that on . . . the defendant being the owner of a stage coach,
the plaintiff took passage therein at .. . to be carried to . .. that the stage
was upset by the carelessness of the driver in the service of the defendant, and
that the plaintiff thereby had his arm broken .... " (Emphasis added.) Id. at 249.
It is obvious that this is practically identical to the method of pleading negligence
under common law pleading. See notes 10-11, supra. See also James, op. cit. supra note
16, at 914.
20 66 Ohio St. 326, 64 N.E. 130 (1902).
21 Ohio Rev. Code § 2309.34 (1953). "When the allegations of a pleading are so
indefinite and uncertain that the precise nature of the charge or defense is not apparent,
the court may require the pleading to be made definite and certain by amendment."
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against him so definite and certain as to enable him to know what
he has to meet, and to prepare his evidence accordingly.
The charge of negligence against the company that it "negli-
gently and carelessly approached and crossed said highway with
said locomotive and train of cars at a high, immoderate and danger-
ous rate of speed," and "negligently and carelessly operated and
handled its said locomotive and train of cars," gave no definite or
certain notice to the company as to what acts of commission or
omission claimed to be negligent would be attempted to be proved
or relied upon at the trial, and therefore the petition should have
been required to be made definite and certain by stating the acts
of commission and omission claimed to have caused the injury,
so as to advise the company as to the facts claimed to have been
negligently done or omitted, and to enable it to meet the same.
Upon the trial the evidence should be confined to the acts of negli-
gence so specifically and definitely averred in the petition. This is
in accordance with the rule of pleading laid down in Davis v.
Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470. It was there held that the fact claimed
to have caused the injury being averred, it was sufficient to state
that it was negligently done. But to say that the company "negli-
gently and carelessly operated and handled its said locomotive and
train of cars," avers no fact as causing the injury, and does not aver
that any fact causing the injury was carelessly done or omitted.
It is a general averment at large of negligence, and the court
erred in overruling the motion to make definite and certain.'
It is clear that court in the Kistler case did not feel that it was depart-
ing from the views expressed in the Guarnieri case. If the court was
merely emphasizing the distinction between a statement of fact and
a conclusion of law, and was of the opinion that in the Guarnieri case
a fact was alleged (selling and delivering poison instead of harmless
medicine?) which the plaintiff therein could properly aver was
negligently done, whereas in the case before it the entire allegation
was merely a conclusion of law, then, of course, it would seem that
there would be no departure-at least in principle. The only quarrel
then, if any, would be with the court's view that in Guarnieri a state-
ment of fact was made, whereas in the case before it no statement of
fact was made but only a bare conclusion of law. Indeed, this view of
the Kistler case may be bolstered to some extent by the wording of its
second syllabus which reads:
In an action founded upon negligence, the petition should state
the acts of commission or omission which the plaintiff claims to have
caused the injury; and that statement being made, it is sufficient
to aver that such acts were carelessly or negligently done, or
omitted.
22 66 Ohio St. 326, 332-3, 64 N.E. 130, 132 (1902). The court also held that it
was error to refuse to strike out the words "at a high, immoderate and dangerous rate
of speed."
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If the court viewed the statement before it as a statement of fact,
then its action in sustaining the motion to make definite and certain
would be inconsistent with the statement made by it in the second
syllabus. On the other hand, it may be that the court in Kistler was of
the opinion that in Guarnieri the act of the defendant complained of
was pleaded with sufficient particularity to be considered a statement
of fact whereas in the case before it the act of the defendant was
pleaded in such a general manner that, while it was technically a
pleading of a fact, the court would treat it as the pleading of a mere
conclusion of law, and require the plaintiff to furnish a more specific
statement of the defendant's act which he then could aver was care-
lessly, or negligently done. This view of Kistler also would
reconcile the action of the court in sustaining the motion to make
definite and certain with the statement made by it in the second
syllabus, referred to above, and, it is submitted, is the proper view to
take of the case. However, it should be observed that the court, in
sustaining the motion to make definite and certain, outlawed the
method of pleading negligence which was permitted at common law
by requiring the plaintiff to describe the defendent's wrongful act
specifically (and not in broad general terms as at common law) ,23
and thus placed a pleading burden upon the plaintiff which, in many
cases at least, the plaintiff cannot feasibly bear.2 4 This, coupled with the
fact that some courts seem to be banning the use of words such as
"carelessly" or "negligently" in describing the defendant's act, on the
theory that such words are pure -conclusions of law,25 may make it
impossible for the plaintiff to plead his case, for in many cases the
standard of care with which to measure the defendant's conduct
is so uncertain that the jury must determine the standard under
proper instruction from the court, and, in making such deter-
mination the jury must consider all of the facts and circumstances
involved2 6 In other words it would seem to be impossible to plead
23 While the court stated that it was following the rule of pleading embraced
in Guarnieri, it is submitted that by requiring the plaintiff to plead specific acts of
negligence, the court was really not following it; for the court in Guarnieri certainly did
not disapprove of the common law method of pleading negligence. See note 17, supra.
24 "Furthermore, it is quite possible that lack of information may prevent a pleader
from being specific even though he is otherwise willing to be so." Cleary, Cases on
Pleading, 85 (1951). "On the other hand automobile accidents happen so suddenly
that it is harsh to tie plaintiff down to specific acts of negligence when he is uncertain
how each witness will testify particularly since defendant in most cases has more precise
knowledge of how the accident occurred than does plaintiff." Note, "Pleading-
Advantages of General Allegations of Negligence," 6 Mo. L. Rev. 512, 515 (1941).
25 See, e.g., Mays v. Morgan, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 317, 145 N.E.2d 159 (1957); Hard-
ware Mut. Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 390, 119 N.E.2d 698 (1954).
26 See Prosser, Torts 192-4 (2d. Ed. 1955).
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facts showing that the specific act of the defendant was negligent
without depicting the exact environment in which the act took place.
On the other hand, it would seem to be impossible to ever depict the
exact environment in which the defendant's act took place-especially
when a dynamic situation is involved.27  Perhaps what such courts
have in mind is the idea that the plaintiff must plead enough facts to
show that the jury might find that the defendant's act was negligent,
but even that requires an answer to the question: "How much is
enough? 2 1
Under some circumstances at least, the fact that the defendant's
conduct constituted a violation of a statute, ordinance, or a rule or
regulation of an administrative body may assist the plaintiff consider-
ably in pleading the facts showing the breach of duty owed by the
defendant.' Where a statute or ordinance enacted in the interest of
public safety prescribes the standard of care required in the form of a
specific requirement, it has been held that a failure to comply there-
with is negligence,3" and plaintiff's petition need only contain facts
which bring the defendant within the liability created by such law in
order to plead a prima facie case against him.31 On the other hand,
where an administrative rule or regulation prescribes such a standard,
it has been held that a failure to comply therewith is merely a matter
which may be properly submitted to and considered by a jury as
bearing upon the question of negligence.32 It is unnecessary here to go
27 Cf., "Many large burdens of pleading, arbitrarily assigned to one litigant, can be
carried only if the pleader may allege conclusions of law. The codes which provided for
fact pleading did not disturb common law burdens of pleading, some of which cannot be
carried by a pleader who may not allege conclusions of law. Courts have rescued
pleaders from the inescapable dilemma by magically transmuting some conclusions of law
into statements of fact.' Morris, "Law and Fact," 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1303, 1337 (1942).
Compare McBride, "Law and Fact in the judicial Process" 5 Ohio Op. 2d 193 (1958).
28 See Cook, op. cit. supra note 5.
20 See Morris, "The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability," 46 Harv. L.
Rev. 453 (1933); Morris, "The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions," 49
Column. L. Rev. 21 (1949); Morris, "The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in
Negligence Actions," 28 Texas L. Rev. 143 (1949).
30 Claypool v. Mohawk Motor, 155 Ohio St. 8, 97 N.E.2d 32 (1951); Bush v.
Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851 (1946); Taugher v. Ling, 127
Ohio St. 142, 187 N.E. 19 (1933) ; Schell v. DuBois, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664 (1916).
But the plaintiff must be within the class for whose benefit the statute was passed.
Kasper v. Oberlin College, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 368 (1934); Desnoyer v. Bradley,
32 Ohio N.P.(n.s.) 430 (1934). And the violation must be the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury. Crose v. Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. Inc., 132 Ohio St. 607, 9 N.E.2d
671 (1937); Jacobs v. The Fuller & Hutsinpiller Co., 67 Ohio St. 70 (1902).
31 The Hadfield-Penfield Steel Co. v. Sheller, 108 Ohio St. 106, 141 N.E. 89 (1923)
(semble); Taugher v. Ling, 127 Ohio St. 142, 187 N.E. 19 (1933) (sembk).
82 Claypool v. Mohawk Motor, 155 Ohio St. 8, 97 N.E.2d 32 (1951); Matz v.
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into the validity of the distinction between the treatment afforded to
a violation of such an ordinance or statute (i.e., negligence per se) as
compared to that afforded to a violation of such a rule or regulation
(i.e., evidence of negligence only)," for it is submitted that so far as
the pleading question is concerned the distinction is immaterial, for
the plaintiff need only plead facts showing a prima facie case against
the defendant,34 and he would be pleading such a case whether he
pleaded facts showing a failure of the defendant to comply with the
specific requirements of a statute, ordinance, or an administrative
rule or regulation. In other words, if violation of such a rule or
regulation is a matter which may properly be submitted to a jury as
bearing upon the question of negligence, then, surely, if the plaintiff
pleads facts showing such a violation, he has pleaded a prima facie
case against the defendant, despite the fact that such a violation does
not constitute negligence per se. Thus, it is obvious that if the defend-
ant's conduct constitutes a violation of such a statute, ordinance, or
rule or regulation,8 5 the plaintiff should have little difficulty in plead-
ing facts showing the defendant's breach of duty, for all he has to do
is to plead facts showing that the defendant failed to comply with the
specific requirement thereof. The only real question left in such a
case is whether the plaintiff must (or even may) plead such statute,
ordinance, or rule or regulation in his petition.
In Ohio the courts are required to take judicial notice of Ohio
statutes, and it is, therefore, unnecessary to plead such statutes in the
pleadings. In fact, in this respect the Ohio Supreme Court has in-
dicated that "any reference to a statute, or any copy of a statute set
out in full, or in substance, or even by reference, in a pleading, should
properly be stricken out upon motion.1 36 However, while Ohio courts
are required by statute to take judicial notice of the statutes of every
Curtis Cartage Co., 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N.E.2d 220 (1937). But see The Penna. R.R. Co.
v. Moses, 42 Ohio App. 220, 182 N.E. 40 (1931) (violation of rule of I.C.C. would be
negligence per se).
33 See Morris, "The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence
Actions," 28 Texas L. Rev. 143 (1949).
34 Gongolewicz v. City of Cleveland, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 442 (1952); McMillan v.
City of Akron, 29 Ohio Ct. App. 271, 45 Ohio C.C. Dec. 541 (1918).
35 If a statute or ordinance does not prescribe a specific requirement, a violation of
such statute or ordinance would not constitute negligence per se. See Eisenhuth v.
Moneyhan, 161 Ohio St. 367, 119 N.E.2d 440 (1954); Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St.
512, 196 N.E. 274 (1935); Heidle v. Baldwin, 118 Ohio St. 375, 161 N.E. 44 (1928).
A fortiori, a violation of an administrative rule or regulation which does not prescribe a
specific requirement should not be negligence per se.
36 The Hadfield-Penfield Steel Co. v. Sheller, supra note 31, at 111, 141 N.E. at 90.
See Ohio Rev. Code § 2309.29 (1953) ("Neither presumptions of law, nor matters of
which judicial notice is taken, need be stated in a pleading .... ).
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state, territory, and other jurisdiction of the United States,37 it is also
provided by statute that:
Any party may present to the trial court any admissible evi-
dence of the statutes of every state, territory, or other jurisdiction
of the United States, but, to enable a party to offer evidence of the
law in another jurisdiction or to ask that judicial notice be taken
thereof, reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse parties
either in the pleadings or otherwise.38 (Emphasis added.)
Because of this statute, it was held by an appellate court that since
the plaintiff failed to plead a provision of the Federal Food and Drug
Act or give any notice to the adverse party that he intended to invoke
the provision of the act at the trial, the trial court acted properly in
advising the plaintiff not to argue the application of such provision of
the act.39 Thus, it would seem that the Ohio legislature has sanctioned
reference in the pleadings to "foreign" statutes, while the Ohio
Supreme Court has deemed improper any reference in the pleadings to
Ohio statutes. It is submitted that reference in the pleadings to any
statutes serves to give notice to the court and to the adverse parties of
the nature of the claim involved, and should therefore be permitted.40
While a municipal court must take judicial notice of the ordi-
nances of its own municipality,41 and, therefore, in suits filed in such
courts a plaintiff need not plead such ordinances, it has been held that
a court of general jurisdiction will not take judicial notice of a munic-
ipal ordinance, and a plaintiff relying upon such ordinance must
plead it if he desires to offer evidence thereof at the trial.' And in
pleading such ordinance, it has been held the plaintiff must set forth
the specific provision of the ordinance upon which he relies or it will
be deemed an insufficient pleading thereof, and evidence with respect
to it will be excluded .4  Finally, in this connection, it should be noted
that in a recent case it was held that where there are two identical
legislative requirements--one an Ohio statute and the other a munic-
ipal ordinance-and the plaintiff pleaded the municipal ordinance
37 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.44 (1953): "Every court of this state shall take judicial
notice of the statutes of every state, territory, and other jurisdiction of the United
States...."
38 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.45 (1953).
39 Kennedy v. General Beauty Products, Inc., 84 Ohio L. Abs. 135, 167 N.E.2d
116 (1960). See also, Price Field Pilots Club, Inc. v. Lee, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 216 (1954).
40 But see McBride, "Law and Fact in the Judicial Process," 5 Ohio Op. 2d 193,
195-196 (1958).
41 Crose v. Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co., Inc., 132 Ohio St. 607, 9 N.E.2d 671 (1937).
42 Schulte v. Johnson, 106 Ohio St. 359, 140 N.E. 116 (1922). But a court of gen-
eral jurisdiction in reviewing a municipal court decision will take the same judicial notice
as did the municipal court. Crose v. Hodge, supra note 41.
43 Heidle v. Baldwin, 118 Ohio St. 375, 161 N.E. 44 (1928).
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in his petition filed in the common pleas court, then since the court
would take judicial notice of the state statute, the city ordinance
pleaded was unnecessary surplusage and should be stricken from the
petition. While there may be no quarrel with such a ruling if the two
legislative requirements are really identical, since it would be possible
for a state statute and a city ordinance to be indentical as far as the
wording is concerned, and yet not be identical as far as the
purpose is concerned, 45 it is submitted that before taking such action
the court should be convinced that the two legislative requirements
are identical in all respects.
With respect to administrative rules and regulations, an Ohio
appellate court has indicated that it was required to take judicial
notice of the rules and regulations issued by the Industrial Com-
mission of Ohio concerning safety requirements to the same extent as
it judicially notices statutory enactments. 4  On the other hand, in a
common pleas court decision it was held that the plaintiff must plead
Civil Air Regulations if he desires to rely thereon at the trial.47 While
the Ohio Supreme Court has not ruled upon this matter, it is sub-
mitted that under modern conditions of reporting legal material,
judicial notice should be taken of all such rules and regulations; 48
the court should, nevertheless, permit the plaintiff to plead them in his
petition because of the notice-giving function thereby served.
If the defendant's conduct has failed to measure up to some
special custom or usage in any particular trade, business or profession,
the plaintiff may, by pleading the existence of such custom or usage49
and the facts which will show that the defendant's conduct failed to
comply therewith, thereby plead a prima facie case against the defend-
ant. While the defendant's failure to adhere to such custom or
usage does not necessarily indicate that he was negligent per se, it
44 Garrison v. City Transit Co., 79 Ohio L. Abs. 29, 150 N.E.2d 94 (1958).
45 In Kasper v. Oberlin College, supra note 30, a state statute required elevator doors
to have electrical interlocking attachments to prevent opening of the door unless the car
was at the floor level. It was held that the statute was designed to protect persons in con-
nection with fire or other emergencies, and not to protect persons from the risk of simply
opening the door and falling down the elevator shaft. Surely, an identically worded city
ordinance could easily be interpreted as being designed to protect against the latter type of
risk.
46 Ibid.
47 Price Field Pilots Club, Inc. v. Lee, supra note 39.
48 Cf. McCormick, Evidence 694 (1954).
49 "A special custom or usage in any particular trade, business, or profession, to be
available to either party, must be specially pleaded." Palmer v. Humiston, 87 Ohio St.
401, 101 N.E. 283 (1913); The Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Potter, 113 Ohio St.
591, 150 N.E. 44 (1925); Cooper v. Cannonball Transp. Co., 19 Ohio L. Abs. 644
(1935).
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seems clear that evidence of the custom or usage and defendant's
conduct should ordinarily require that the case be submitted to the
jury,50 and that fact alone should indicate that the plaintiff must be
deemed to have pleaded a prima facie case.
Again, if the case is one to which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is applicable, it seems clear that the plaintiff should have little dif-
ficulty with the requirement that facts be pleaded showing the de-
fendant's breach of duty, for by virtue of that doctrine, the plaintiff
need only plead the facts calling for the application of the doctrine,
and the defendant's breach of duty will be presumed. 1 Thus, if such
facts are pleaded, the plaintiff, in this case also, will have pleaded a
prima facie case without too much trouble.
From the above it is apparent that if the case is one in which a
statute, ordinance, administrative rule or regulation, or custom and
usage is involved, or if the facts are such that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is applicable, the plaintiff should have little difficulty in
meeting the requirement that facts be pleaded showing the defendant's
breach of duty. It is also apparent, however, that absent such a case
the task of meeting the requirement is one which cannot feasibly be
done by the plaintiff, especially if the view of some of the judges
toward the pleading of conclusions of law and the use of words like
"carelessly" or "negligently" is followed.5 2
Perhaps the solution lies in a return to the method of pleading
negligence which sufficed at common law and which, it is submitted,
was looked upon with favor by the court in Guarnieri,53 but was con-
demned in Kistler.4 It seems safe to say that Kistler, as the leading
case for the proposition that specific acts of negligence must be
[0 See Prosser, Torts 135-7 (2d ed. 1955).
51 See Fink v. The New York C. R.R. Co., 144 Ohio St. 1, 56 N.E.2d 456 (1944)
(Railroad car derailed-doctrine applied---dictum that doctrine is applicable irrespective
of whether petition contains allegations of specific acts of negligence) ; Beeler v. Ponting,
116 Ohio St. 432, 156 N.E. 599 (1927) (doctrine, being a rule of evidence, need not be
pleaded). Compare Winslow v. The Ohio Bus Line Co., 148 Ohio St. 101, 73 N.E.2d
504 (1947) (doctrine not applicable where petition and proof disclose that plaintiff had
knowledge of the facts and circumstances showing the claimed negligence). That Winslow
hasn't changed the Ohio rule concerning the effect of pleading specific acts of negligence
on the right to invoke the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, see Rigney v. The Cincinnati St.
Ry. Co., 99 Ohio App. 105, 131 N.E.2d 413 (1954). But see the dissenting opinion of
Fess, j. in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Henry J. Spieker Co., 103 Ohio App. 455, 146 N.E.2d
138 (1957).
52 See notes 24-27, supra.
53 Davis v. Guarnieri, supra note 13. judge Clark long ago expressed the view that
the reaction from code pleading "must necessarily be towards the common law." Clark,
"Pleading Negligence," op. cit. supra note 11, at 484.
54 The New York, C. & St. L. R.R. Co. v. Kistler, supra note 20.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
pleaded by the plaintiff and that the evidence must be confined to
such specific acts pleaded,55 is responsible for the widespread practice
of counsel in negligence cases of pleading specifications of negligence
-a practice which has been resoundingly condemned by some of the
courts."6 While it may be that the courts in such cases are not intend-
ing to prohibit a plaintiff from pleading as many specific acts of
negligence as the circumstances justify, and are incensed only because
of the presence in the petition of repetitious allegations, inflammatory
language or conclusions of law,5" nevertheless they do seem impatient
with counsel for filing the lengthy petitions which the pleading of
many specific acts requires, in view of the code requirement that the
petition contain a statement of facts constituting a cause of action
"in ordinary and concise language. '5 8 But, as was long ago observed,
since counsel will be unwilling to be restricted with respect to the
evidence he may offer at the trial, he will naturally plead as many
specific acts as he can think of for there is no penalty for pleading too
many grounds of recovery.59 And, as was further observed long ago,
the more of such specific acts the plaintiff pleads, the less the defend-
ant will know about the plaintiff's case against him.6" Clearly, the
notice-giving function, supposedly served by the pleading of specific
acts of negligence, may be easily sidestepped by the plaintiff if he so
desires.
It would also seem clear that while under the code a plaintiff
must plead "facts" constituting a cause of action in his petition,
neither the commissioners who drafted the code, nor the legislature
55 See O'Leary v. Penna R.R. Co., 70 Ohio L. Abs. 133, 127 N.E.2d 877 (1953);
Hell v. Proctor, 12 Ohio App. 35 (1919); The Cincinnati, L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Shurts,
10 Ohio App. 226 (1918); Mays v. Morgan, supra note 25; Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v.
McGinnis, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 390, 119 N.E.2d 698 (1954); Brown v. Pennsylvania Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 29 Ohio Ops. 442 (1944); McBride, op. cit. supra note 40, at 195. But
see, New York, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Gulla, 15 Ohio C.C.R.(n.s.) 540, 24 Ohio C.C. Dec.
101 (1911); The Pennsylvania Co. v. Gulling, 5 Ohio App. 183, 25 Ohio C.C.R.(n.s.)
326 (1916), motion to certify overruled, 5 Ohio App. 41, 14 Ohio L. Rep. 180 (1916).
56 See Mays v. Morgan, supra note 25. Uccello v. Interstate Truck Service, Inc., 70
Ohio L. Abs. 211, 57 Ohio Ops. 334, 126 N.E.2d 77 (1954); Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v.
McGinnis, supra note 55.
57 See Mays v. Morgan, supra note 25.
58 Ohio Rev. Code § 2309.04 (1953):
The first pleading shall be the petition by the plaintiff, which must contain:
(A) A statement of facts constituting a cause of action in ordinary and concise
language; ...
59 Clark, op. cit. supra note 11, at 487 and 489.
60 Clark, op. cit. supra note 11, at 489. "Observe, however, that a plethora of
information may tend to obscure rather than enlighten. Plaintiff who specifies fifteen
grounds of negligence when in fact he intends to rely only upon one has pretty effectively
screened the true nature of his case." Cleary, Cases on Pleading 85, note 1 (1951).
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which adopted it, intended to absolutely exclude from pleadings words
such as "carelessly" or "negligently."'" Most of the authorities who
take a contrary position seem to base their arguments upon statements
made by Pomeroy in his treatise on code remedies,62 or on statements
made by other authorities who in turn relied upon Pomeroy's state-
ments. It has been capably pointed out, however, that it is question-
able whether Pomeroy took such a position, and that, in any event,
such was certainly not the view of those who drafted and adopted
the codes throughout the country.63
It is submitted, therefore, that a return to the method of pleading
negligence under the common law is warranted under the code, and at
least should be permitted in a case where neither a statute, ordinance,
administrative rule or regulation, or custom and usage is involved, nor
the doctrine or res ipsa loquitur applicable. This method of pleading
negligence is sanctioned under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,6 4
and there would seem to be no evidence to indicate that defendants
have been unable to adequately prepare their defense as a con-
sequence." No doubt, if permitted and if a case arises in which the
defendant actually is unable to adequately prepare his case because
of the generality of the charge of negligence against him, the court
should and would afford him relief by sustaining his motion to make
definite and certain. It is submitted, however, that the test in such
cases should be the same as the test at common law when a bill of
particulars was sought,6 6 and the motion sustained only after a show-
ing would have warranted relief at common law.
61 See notes 18-19, supra. See also James, op. cit. supra note 16, at 913-4.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 and Form 9 in the Appendix of Forms.
65 But see Bush v. Skidis, 8 F.R.D. 561 (EMfl. Mo. 1948), holding that a petition
framed in accordance with Form 9 should be made more definite by specifying the
particular negligence relied upon. See, however, Petriken v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 14
F.R.D. 31 (W.D. Mo. 1953), refusing to follow Bush, and holding that petition framed
in accordance with Form 9 is not subject to attack by a motion to make definite and
certain.
66 See Clark, op. cit. supra note 11, at 488-9; Hook, op. cit. supra note 12, at 316-7.
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